The unlawful eviction action of Michael J Rotondo by the State of New York.

Yes it says unlawful, and here’s how that’s true.

I was seeking the findings that I was entitled to a six-month notice to quit; and the common law requirement of a six-month notice to quit is taken from the way, that much more significant arrangements are required, by someone who is depending on their landlord for housing support; in order for them to be prepared to vacate those premises. In other words, anyone who is already paying rent to a landlord in exchange for housing, does not need to make significant changes in order to establish another living situation, because they only need to find another place to rent where they may pay rent just the same. Whereas, anyone who is depending on the support of a landlord, needs more time to establish the means to provide housing for themselves without that same assistance. These same means includes a job, and some savings from that job; and each may very well take 6 months to establish. Without a six-month time-frame, a person whom is being ejected by their landlord enters a situation which is very stressful, and may result in a situation in which they are without housing, solely because they did not have enough time to make the arrangements necessary for housing else-ware.

When the Judge at my ejectment action turned that action into a summary judgment proceeding, and evicted me, he overturned Kakwani v. Kakwani. In Kakwani v. Kakwani it was found that a family member cannot be removed through a summary proceeding. While the Petitioner had stated correctly that I had moved out of her home, then back in, this same fact does not invoke any exception to an ejectment action that may be taken from this annotation in McKinney’s Consolidated Laws of New York:
“This is the case because where the occupancy of the subject premises arises out of the “familial relationship,” such as an adult child who has lived in the family home since birth, a summary proceeding may not be maintained.”
And this does not invoke any exception to an ejectment action because honestly, it simply isn’t a reasonable consideration. Is it reasonable to consider that it’s possible for someone to have the means to support themselves in one month (meaning a 30 day notice to quit could be used to evict an adult child that at some point, had lived outside the “family home”), while not having any income 30 days prior to this? I guess it could be, but I just don’t think it’s very orderly; and while there’s no need for any expedition by the Petitioner, how can it be considered reasonable that the law should allow a Petitioner to place anyone in an emergency situation to find housing for no reason?

Further, it makes a lot of sense to me that, if an adult child that has at one point lived outside the family home, and because of this is not entitled to a six-month notice to quit, that this same adult child who isn’t entitled to a six-month notice to quit then must have the same or similar income as they did, while living outside the family home. Otherwise, what is the underlying difference between this same adult child, and one who is entitled to a six-month notice to quit? What else could give rise to these different considerations that would in fact make these two situations different? The law doesn’t exist to create novel circumstances that give reporters something to put on the news, the law is supposed to beget a very dull and uneventful order.

There were two relevant cases that I had cited for this matter of my parents attempting to remove me from my home, Kakwani v. Kakwani and Kosa v. Legg. The findings from Kakwani v. Kakwani were that a family member cannot be evicted through a summary proceeding (which itself can yield an order after a 30 day notice to quit is served and 30 days have elapsed) and instead, an ejectment action must be taken to remove. If you read the part that says [Holding:] and [2] Ejectment on the case’s Slip Op. (both there right on the front page, which is available as a link below), you can extrapolate without very much trouble that these are in fact the findings. From this case I claimed that I had the right to an ejectment proceeding according to Kakwani v. Kakwani, when I was first brought to eviction court through a summary proceeding in the town of Camillus.

Now as for the State Court matter, the findings from Kosa v. Legg state that for an ejectment action to be substantiated, the Petitioners must serve onto the Respondent a six-month notice to quit. You can see that in Kosa v. Legg (link below) it is referenced that there is a “common law requirement of six-month notice to quit”, in the [Holding:] part of the case right on the first page. It seemed crystal clear to me that I was entitled to a six-month notice before I could be removed, and that there was no doubt to this. The court used the case that the Petitioner’s attorney cited in their (the Petitioner(s)) response to my claims, to evict me; After having “switched” the case into a summary judgment action. So let’s evaluate the applicability of that case which the Petitioner’s attorney used to respond to my counterclaims.

This same case that was cited by the Petitioners was Heckman v. Heckman, which from what I can see, consists of three relevant parties. These parties were, the Heckman living in the home whom was wished removed, herself hereafter referred to as the “licensee”, the Heckman who was the landlord, hereafter referred to as the “landlord”, and a third party, whom was the owner of the home before they had become deceased, and then thereby had left the landlord as the new owner of the property; as the home was bequeathed to her. We’ll refer to this party who is the deceased previous owner as the “previous owner”. So now that we have all the parties and the terminology established, let’s move on to the actual subject matter of case (we’re about halfway there already just with the terminology).

The licensee was living with the previous owner (rent free I believe) while the previous owner had passed on. In the will of the previous owner, the home was left to the landlord. The landlord attempted to evict the licensee through a summary proceeding and the licensee made the counterclaim that she was entitled to an ejectment action. The Court found in the ejectment action that the licensee was not a family member, and thereby not entitled to an ejectment action; Here’s how I believe those findings came to be. Throughout the time in which the licensee was living with the previous owner, the licensee did not seem to have asked the previous owner, about what would happen to her housing situation if he (the previous owner) were to become deceased, while also, and most significantly (in my opinion), the previous owner had made no alternative arrangements in his will for the licensee regarding her housing arrangements, for the time after he passes. It is my interpretation of findings in Heckman v. Heckman that it is from this failure to make these arrangements by each and both parties, which themselves entitle the landlord the right to recover the property through a summary judgement proceeding, and not an ejectment action; The licensee’s license had been revoked upon the death of the property owner. The licensee making a claim that she was entitled to a six-month notice to quit, after the property owner had become deceased, is comparable to someone trying to negotiate the buy-out price on a lease for a vehicle, after the lease duration has run out. The licensee (pun intended) can easily be considered to have been responsible for the production of the arrangements for the period of time after which the lease has expired, thereafter; and done this before the lease had expired. As it is known, as a matter of fact, that that the lease will eventually run out.

The question now, at this juncture of our analysts, is how it is that Heckman v. Heckman was relevant to my case, in such a way that it allowed the court to switch the proceeding to a summery judgment matter, and then evict me? Well, in Heckman v. Heckman, someone who thought they were entitled to a six month notice to quit, was in fact not; and the court found that this matter was the same. This is the analysis that I’ve come away with. I have yet to look up my case to see what the summary says about the effect that the case will have on other housing actions. I suppose I will do so and post an update, as I imagine that it will say that my case has overturned Kakwani v. Kakwani.

Now there is one alternative finding that I have been considering, and it’s that I was found to not be a family member; and my opinion in response to these considerations I’m claiming are privileged…

kakwwani v. kakwani

kosa v. legg

heckman v heckman